Kenneth Bloom to Speak at the 2016 CLM National Construction Claims Conference in San Diego CA
Gartner + Bloom is proud to announce that managing partner Kenneth Bloom will be speaking at the 2016 CLM National Construction Claims Conference. The conference will be held in the Manchester Grand Hyatt in San Diego, California, September 28-30.
This September, the Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM) will hold the most comprehensive construction claims conference ever. In addition to addressing construction defect claims, conference sessions will also address facets of construction-related claims including construction site accidents/injuries, coverage issues, subcontractor issues, and new technologies. Sessions also will address issues on the national, regional, and state levels.
Prior to founding Gartner + Bloom, Ken was an Assistant District Attorney, Kings County, New York, 1981-1982; Senior Staff Attorney, New York City Mayor's Strike Force, 1982-1983; Partner, O'Donnell, Fox & Gartner, P.C., New York City, 1983-1990; Resident Senior Partner Cozen and O'Connor, New York City, 1991-1994.Ken is a member of the New York State Former District Attorneys Association, Brooklyn, New York; Pennsylvania and American Bar Associations- member of the Tort and Insurance Practice Section and Alternate Dispute Resolution Section; Co- chair of the Construction Committee of the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution (2004-2005); District of Columbia Bar and the New York County Lawyers Association. He is a frequent lecturer on construction and coverage related topics, as well as ADR.
MOLD PERSONAL INJURY LAWSUITS: WHY DO THEY CONTINUE? By Arthur P. Xanthos
In our August 6, 2014 article, we explained the import of the New York State Court of Appeals' Cornell decision -- without medical community acceptance of causation between mold and bodily injury, courts in New York State will dismiss lawsuits for bodily injury premised on mold.
Since the Cornell decision came down, this Firm has used it twice to dismiss mold-related bodily injury claims against our clients: first in June of 2014 in Benton v. 80 Cranberry, and now in August of 2016 in a case called Sylla-ba v. The Colton Condominium. (Both of these decisions can be accessed on the Firm's website, www.gartnerbloom.com, under Publications.) In Sylla-ba, Justice Cynthia Kern reiterated what the Court of Appeals held: an 'association' between mold and the alleged symptoms of a plaintiff is not the same as 'causation' between them; therefore, proving that there is such an association is insufficient for the bodily injury claims to survive dismissal.
Cornell should have resulted in a sharp drop in the number of mold-related personal injury lawsuits brought in New York's state courts; yet these lawsuits continue to be brought in roughly the same numbers as before Cornell. We suspect the reasons for this counter-intuitive statistic are, (1) the plaintiffs' bar's unfamiliarity with the 2014 Cornell decision (viz., the flawed belief that if you can get one doctor to say 'mold caused the plaintiff's illness', that such is sufficient), (2) the use of a mold-related bodily injury claim as an 'add on' claim to bolster the settlement value of the case, and (3) publication in the popular press of other states' mold verdicts and settlements.
So, we repeat what we wrote in our August 6, 2014 entry: Absent a major change in the science of mold illness, the next few years will see many more summary judgment decisions in favor of land owners and against mold plaintiffs.
-APX 8/15/2016
Since the Cornell decision came down, this Firm has used it twice to dismiss mold-related bodily injury claims against our clients: first in June of 2014 in Benton v. 80 Cranberry, and now in August of 2016 in a case called Sylla-ba v. The Colton Condominium. (Both of these decisions can be accessed on the Firm's website, www.gartnerbloom.com, under Publications.) In Sylla-ba, Justice Cynthia Kern reiterated what the Court of Appeals held: an 'association' between mold and the alleged symptoms of a plaintiff is not the same as 'causation' between them; therefore, proving that there is such an association is insufficient for the bodily injury claims to survive dismissal.
Cornell should have resulted in a sharp drop in the number of mold-related personal injury lawsuits brought in New York's state courts; yet these lawsuits continue to be brought in roughly the same numbers as before Cornell. We suspect the reasons for this counter-intuitive statistic are, (1) the plaintiffs' bar's unfamiliarity with the 2014 Cornell decision (viz., the flawed belief that if you can get one doctor to say 'mold caused the plaintiff's illness', that such is sufficient), (2) the use of a mold-related bodily injury claim as an 'add on' claim to bolster the settlement value of the case, and (3) publication in the popular press of other states' mold verdicts and settlements.
So, we repeat what we wrote in our August 6, 2014 entry: Absent a major change in the science of mold illness, the next few years will see many more summary judgment decisions in favor of land owners and against mold plaintiffs.
-APX 8/15/2016
WHERE THERE’S A WILL, THERE’S A FAMILY – By ALEXANDER D. FISHER, ESQ.
Recently, the Firm succeeded in obtaining summary judgment on behalf of our client - a well-known catering establishment in Great Neck, New York - in a case involving a dispute over the ownership rights of shares in a family-owned business.
In this matter, Plaintiff, one of the sons of the deceased founder of the business, sought to block his stepmother from taking shares of the company that had been bequeathed to her by the decedent’s “pour over” will and subsequent trust. Plaintiff argued that per the terms of a shareholders agreement for the business, which pre-dated the will by almost 20 years, his stepmother was not entitled to hold the shares because the agreement had purportedly limited the right to hold shares to “family members”. Plaintiff argued that as a spouse of the decedent, his step-mother did not qualify as a “blood” relative, and therefore was not a family member. He also noted that a separate clause in the agreement required any spouse who was no longer married to a member of the decedent’s family to return her shares in the company, and argued that since the decedent had passed away, his stepmother could no longer be married to him. He accordingly commenced a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that his stepmother was not entitled to hold these shares, and forcing her to sell the shares to the remaining shareholders, including Plaintiff.
In our motion for summary judgment, we argued that there was no language in the shareholders agreement that limited the right to hold shares to “blood” relatives – rather, the agreement limited the right to hold shares to family members. Accordingly, as the spouse of the decedent at the time of his death, the stepmother was clearly a family member under any reasonable definition of the term. We noted that the requirement in the agreement requiring divestiture of shares in the company once a spouse was no longer married to a member of the decedent’s family was clearly limited to spouses of the decedent’s relatives – there was no clause requiring the spouse of the decedent himself to return any shares she held. We also noted that Plaintiff had repeatedly acquiesced to his stepmother receiving the shares, both in a very detailed waiver agreement signed in Florida at the time of the distribution of shares from the trust, and in multiple clear ratifications of his stepmother’s status as a shareholder thereafter. Furthermore, we argued that per the terms of the waiver, any contest to the terms of the trust were to be made in Florida under Florida law, and that pursuant to the statute of limitations governing such claims in Florida, Plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations from challenging the terms of the trust.
In his decision, Nassau County Justice Thomas Feinman agreed with our position that Plaintiff’s stepmother unquestionably qualified as a member of the family based upon even a narrow reading of the term “family”. The Court also found that the terms of the agreement did not contemplate the return of shares held by the decedent’s spouse upon his death, but only those shares held by a spouse of the decedent’s relatives. Moreover, Justice Feinman noted that Plaintiff had unequivocally waived his right to challenge the grant of shares to his stepmother when he executed the waiver agreement at the time the shares were transferred. The Court therefore granted our clients summary judgment as to all claims asserted against them.
This decision highlights the value of a well-worded waiver agreement relating to the distribution of property from an estate or a trust, particularly when there may be the potential for inter-family squabbles down the line. Such an agreement allows the parties finality, and ensures that an aggrieved relative will not seek to undo various grants of property years later. The decision also illustrates the value of a carefully drafted agreement regarding transfer of shares in a business, and how a seemingly mundane choice of words when drafting agreements can have massive unforeseen consequences a generation later.
The decision, Sessa v Sessa, can be found on this Firm’s website under Publications.
-7/19/16
New York City Building Owners and the Legionella Outbreak, by Arthur P. Xanthos
This past week has seen an outbreak of legionella in buildings in the South Bronx section of New York City. Legionella is the bacterium that causes legionnaires disease and flourishes in the water of air conditioning and central heating systems. Utmost concern is for the health and safety of building residents, and pending New York City regulations address this concern by imposing on building owners new registration, testing, and maintenance requirements. Given the number of deaths and hospitalizations already reported, building owners and their insurers should be aware of the following facts and suggestions:
1. There have been fewer than a dozen reported legionella/personal injury decisions in New York State in the last decade, and far fewer such decisions involving residential buildings. As in any toxic tort lawsuit, the legionella claimant will have the burden of proving that the building owner negligently allowed a toxin to develop (namely, legionella), and that the claimant was exposed to the toxin in an amount that caused injury to the claimant -- two very difficult though not impossible burdens to meet. (For a detailed discussion of the burden of proving causation in toxic tort lawsuits, see our prior blog entry titled Mold up in the Air: Settled.)
2. A building owner must report to its insurance carrier immediately any notice of bodily injury or property damage arising from the outbreak. A building owner should also notify its HVAC/cooling tower contractor, and the insurer for that contractor, of the incident(s).
3. The insurance carrier for its part must assemble a pre-lawsuit response team -- legal, engineering, medical, and environmental -- to investigate the premises and establish the facts.
4. New York City is now inspecting and testing building cooling systems. As these test results will be admissible in any subsequent lawsuit, building owners (or, preferably, their insurance carriers) should retain environmental consultants to photograph, monitor, and report on how the City performs the testing.
5. Finally, if the cooling tower or HVAC system is going to be dismantled or modified significantly, care should be taken to avoid a spoliation penalty. (For a detailed discussion of this topic, see our prior blog entry titled Spoiling the Evidence, Spoiling the Case.)
-APX 8/10/15
1. There have been fewer than a dozen reported legionella/personal injury decisions in New York State in the last decade, and far fewer such decisions involving residential buildings. As in any toxic tort lawsuit, the legionella claimant will have the burden of proving that the building owner negligently allowed a toxin to develop (namely, legionella), and that the claimant was exposed to the toxin in an amount that caused injury to the claimant -- two very difficult though not impossible burdens to meet. (For a detailed discussion of the burden of proving causation in toxic tort lawsuits, see our prior blog entry titled Mold up in the Air: Settled.)
2. A building owner must report to its insurance carrier immediately any notice of bodily injury or property damage arising from the outbreak. A building owner should also notify its HVAC/cooling tower contractor, and the insurer for that contractor, of the incident(s).
3. The insurance carrier for its part must assemble a pre-lawsuit response team -- legal, engineering, medical, and environmental -- to investigate the premises and establish the facts.
4. New York City is now inspecting and testing building cooling systems. As these test results will be admissible in any subsequent lawsuit, building owners (or, preferably, their insurance carriers) should retain environmental consultants to photograph, monitor, and report on how the City performs the testing.
5. Finally, if the cooling tower or HVAC system is going to be dismantled or modified significantly, care should be taken to avoid a spoliation penalty. (For a detailed discussion of this topic, see our prior blog entry titled Spoiling the Evidence, Spoiling the Case.)
-APX 8/10/15
WE’VE MOVED!
G + B is pleased to announce the relocation of our New York offices. To accommodate our continued growth, you will now find us in significantly larger premises at 801 Second Avenue occupying the entire 11th floor. Our new state of art facilities are designed to serve our clients more effectively, and comfortably and efficiently accommodate our current professional and support staff as well as our anticipated expansion over the next several months and years.
Drop by to say hello and tour the new place!
Drop by to say hello and tour the new place!
Ignoring Court Ordered Discovery Leads to Preclusion of Tenant’s Claim, by Arthur Xanthos
Dentists are fond of saying if you ignore your teeth, your teeth will go away. The same is true in litigation: ignore your discovery obligations and your claim will go away. This Firm is defending a building owner in a case brought by a tenant (who happens to be a lawyer). The tenant alleges among other things bodily injury from second-hand smoke in his apartment. As is customary, we demanded medical authorizations (to secure medical records related to the tenant's treatment) and a bill of particulars compelling the plaintiff to particularize his bodily injuries. We also made sure the court included those demands in several court orders.
For unknown reasons, the plaintiff-tenant-lawyer refused to hand over medical authorizations and refused to particularize his injuries. After several attempts at securing the documents failed, this Firm made a motion to compel the tenant to produce the medical authorizations and to serve a meaningful bill of particulars. That motion resulted in an order, with which the plaintiff-tenant-lawyer failed to comply. So another motion was made, and this time an order was sought to preclude/dismiss the tenant's bodily injury claims. That second motion resulted in a more stringent order setting another deadline for the tenant's compliance, and warning the tenant of penalties for non-compliance. The tenant again failed to comply. At a subsequent conference and upon being advised of the tenant's non-compliance, the court after oral argument precluded the tenant from any bodily injury claims at trial, and dismissed any negligence claims found in his complaint. A copy of this decision/order (Johnson v. 78/79 York) can be found at this Firm's website (www.gbglaw.com) under Publications.
Preclusion orders are very rare, especially against pro se plaintiffs. Counsel should expect to make more than one motion, and should request a progressively stronger sanction with each motion made. Obtaining such an order is not a quick exercise either, as it took nearly two years to secure the one discussed herein. -APX 12/16/14
For unknown reasons, the plaintiff-tenant-lawyer refused to hand over medical authorizations and refused to particularize his injuries. After several attempts at securing the documents failed, this Firm made a motion to compel the tenant to produce the medical authorizations and to serve a meaningful bill of particulars. That motion resulted in an order, with which the plaintiff-tenant-lawyer failed to comply. So another motion was made, and this time an order was sought to preclude/dismiss the tenant's bodily injury claims. That second motion resulted in a more stringent order setting another deadline for the tenant's compliance, and warning the tenant of penalties for non-compliance. The tenant again failed to comply. At a subsequent conference and upon being advised of the tenant's non-compliance, the court after oral argument precluded the tenant from any bodily injury claims at trial, and dismissed any negligence claims found in his complaint. A copy of this decision/order (Johnson v. 78/79 York) can be found at this Firm's website (www.gbglaw.com) under Publications.
Preclusion orders are very rare, especially against pro se plaintiffs. Counsel should expect to make more than one motion, and should request a progressively stronger sanction with each motion made. Obtaining such an order is not a quick exercise either, as it took nearly two years to secure the one discussed herein. -APX 12/16/14